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NOTES
THE LAW OF BURIAL INSURANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Burial insurance, used in the sense of a risk-shifting device to aid the
less fortunate, has existed in the form of friendly societies from time im-
memorial. 1 Indeed, it is probable that this noncommercial type was the first
form of insurance. There is some evidence that such societies existed in
Egypt, 2500 B.C.2 There exists more concrete evidence that they thrived
in ancient China, India, Greece and Rome. 3 The Grecian societies, although
largely religious and ritualistic, had as their main function the guarantee of a
decent burial for their members.4 The existence around A.D. 117-138 of
Roman societies, called collegia, is established beyond doubt by the finding of
a marble bearing an inscription setting forth the by-laws., Although there
is no documentary proof, it is probable that the societies survived the in-
vasions and continued to exist in their ancient form until they were revived
by the medieval guilds with many attributes of our modern mutual benefit
organizations. 6
In modern insurance, the means for providing burial insurance have taken
several forms. The first type is a standard policy written by regularly con-
stituted life insurance companies under which the insured is guaranteed at
death a funeral worth a fixed sum. These policies usually provide for a cash
payment in lieu of services at the death of the insured, or can be surrendered
for cash during the life of the policy7 The second type is entirely different.
1. Vance, Early History of Insurance Law, 8 COL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1908).
2. TRENERRY, TE ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY OF INSURANCE 173 (1926). This
seems somewhat "far-fetched" to one noted authority on insurance. PATTERSON, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 80, n.2 (2d ed. 1947).
3. Vance, supra note 1, at 3.
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at 4, n.13: "An Association (collegium) constituted under the provisions of
a decree of the Roman Senate and People, to the honor of Diana and Antinous, by which
decree the privilege is granted of meeting, assembling and acting collectively. Anyone
desiring to pay a monthly subscription for funeral rites may attend the meetings of the
Association; but persons are not allowed, under the color of this Association, to meet
more than once a month, and that only for the purpose of contributing for the sepulture of
the dead. Ye who are desirous of becoming new members of this Association, first read
through its laws carefully, and so enter it as not afterwards to complain, or to leave a
subject of dispute to your heirs. It is absolutely required by the Association that anyone
wishing to enter, shall pay an entrance-fee of one hundred sesterces, give an amphora of
good wine, and pay as monthly dues five asses... "
6. PATTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 80 (2d ed. 1947) ; Vance, supra
note 1, at 4.
7. See, e.g., specimen policies of Cosmopolitan Life Insurance Company, Memphis,
and Consolidated Insurance Company, Nashville. The provision for cash Instead of
burial services is required by some state statutes. See note 67 infra.
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This involves an arrangement whereby a group of people associate and provide
for the burial of any member from a fund accumulated by regular payments or
assessments from each member. Usually such associations are organized by
enterprising undertakers who contract with the association to furnish the
burial services for a stipulated price.8 A third type is worthy of mention.
An insured under an industrial life policy can be assured of a burial by
assigning the policy to an undertaker who will agree to furnish funeral services
for the face amount of the policy.9 Since this is not strictly burial insurance
but is otherwise orthodox industrial insurance, an extended discussion of this
type is not warranted.
Many problems of state regulation arise in connection with the two
primary types, especially burial associations, where the possibilities of fraud
make the need for regulation acute. It is the purpose of this Note to indicate
and discuss some of these problems. Cases will be collected and discussed
concerning the courts' treatment of the somewhat unrelated aspects of burial
insurance contracts. The principal reason for choosing this topic for discus-
sion is the fact that it has been practically ignored by legal writers. Texts and
encyclopedias have treated it but briefly, and law reviews have almost com-
pletely neglected it. Generally, state legislatures have been apathetic in acting
on the problem. Yet its importance and scope cannot be minimized. Burial
insurance has a strong natural appeal to the poor because of the horror conjured
by the thought of being buried in potter's field. According to one study, in
several southern states in 1943 one half the total population held membership
in burial associations.
10
II. APPLICATION OF GENERAL INSURANCE STATUTES
Burial insurance is life insurance since it is determinable upon human
life and is dependent upon that contingency.'1 This is the almost universal
holding of courts faced with the problem of applying state regulatory insurance
laws to arrangements guaranteeing a burial at death.' 2 Burial insurance has
been defined as "a contract based upon a legal consideration, whereby the
obligor undertakes to furnish the obligee, or one of the latter's near relatives,
8. 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 14 (1941).
9. See, e.g., assignment form of Life and Casualty Insurance Co. However, an
assignment of this type is void by statute in Ohio as being in restraint of trade. See
Robbins v. Hennessey, 86 Ohio St. 181, 99 N.E. 319 (1912), construing and holding
constitutional what is now OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 666 (1946).
10. See PATTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 29 (1947), citing Botts,
A New Development i, Burial Insurance, 21 JOUR. Am. INS. 9 (1944).
11. 1 JOYCE, INSURANCE § 336d (2d ed. 1917).
12. E.g., State v. Willett, 171 Ind. 296, 86 N.E. 68, 23 L.R.A. (N.s.) 197 (1908);
Renschler v. State, 90 Ohio St. 363, 107 N.E. 758, 1915D L.R.A. 501 (1914) ; Oklahoma
Southwestern Burial Ass'n v. State, 135 Okla. 151, 274 Pac. 642, 63 A.L.R. 704 (1928).
See additional cases cited in note 27 in!ra.
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at death, a burial reasonably worth a fixed sum."' 3 The fact that a burial policy
is payable not in money but in services equal in value to money is not sufficient
to exclude it from classification as a life insurance contract.1
4
Of the many different standard forms of life insurance, burial insurance,
as written by regularly constituted companies complying with state insurance
laws, is most nearly like industrial insurance. The two have these features
in common: (1) strong appeal to the low income group, (2) small or limited
amount for which each type is written, and (3) small premiums usually
collected at short periodical intervals by agents of the insurer. It has
been said that industrial insurance amounts in fact to burial insurance because
the benefits usually accrue to the insured rather than to his beneficiaries. 15
As insurance, contracts for burial benefits are perfectly valid provided there
is corhpliance with state' regulatory laws.'0 These contracts are regarded
favorably by the law as being socially desirable. 17
Few problems of state regulation arise out of the standard burial policies.
These policies are usually written by regularly constituted life insurance
companies at standard rates. Thus there is no twilight zone in which it
is doubtful that state insurance laws are applicable, as is sometimes the
case with burial associations. The insurer's books are subjected to periodical
inspection by the insurance commissioner, and the provisions of the policy are
carefully scrutinized. Since reserve requirements guaranteeing financial re-
sponsibility are rigid under state insurance laws, companies offering this
type of policy overcome one of the chief objections to burial associations.18
Companies entering this field have found it lucrative since they get no competi-
tion from the large standard life companies which have chosen not to deal
in this type of contract, probably because of the small amount involved and
the necessity of dealing with a local undertaker.'0 Where volume of business
and convenience warrant it, a company may organize and incorporate its
13. 1 JoYcE, INSURANCE § 7c (2d ed. 1917). See Sisson ex rel. Nardolillo v. Prata
Undertaking Co., 49 R.I. 132, 141 Atl. 76 (1928).
14. See Benevolent Burial Ass'n v. Harrison, 181 Ga. 230, 181 S.E. 829 (1935),
where it was held that an association offering funeral services was engaged in the life
,insurance business even though the statutory definition of a life insurance policy was a
contract to pay a certain amount of money upon death. And see 1 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA
OF INSURANCE LAW § 32 (Cum. Supp. 1945).
15. See Gontrum v. Union Liberty Life Ins. Co., 177 Md. 624, 11 A.2d 625, 627 (1940);
1 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 32 (1929). "It is not the purpose to create
an estate for administration, the payment of debts, and distribution among next of kin.
The end and aim is to provide for a proper burial and funeral when the occasion arrives."
Jordan's Mut. Aid Ass'n v. Edwards, 232 Ala. 80, 166 So. 780, 781 (1936).
16. 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 14 (Supp. 1952).
17. The public is relieved of a possible burial charge, and the kindred of the insured
are spared the humiliation of having a member of the family buried as a pauper. See
State ex rel. Reece v. Gooch, 165 Tenn. 97, 101, 52 S.W.2d 143 (1932).
18. BusINEss WEEK, Oct. 20, 1945, p. 48.
19. Ibid.
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own funeral homes to perform the obligations the company incurs finder its
policies.2 0 Where this is not practicable the company may act as agent for
the insured in contracting with an .independent undertaker for services at
a price equal to the face value of the policy, or an assignment to an undertaker
may be made where not prohibited by state law.
21
An entirely different approach to burial insurance is furnished by burial
associations. When unhampered by state regulation these associ'ations flourish,
often preying on the public for the personal profit which accrues to the
undertakers organizing them.2 2 The objections to associations of this nature,
whether financed by regular installments or by assessments made on each
member at the death of other members, are numerous. (1) The possibilities of
fraud are exceedingly great. The contracts into which the members enter are
drawn by the association without the restraining force of the state com-
missioner of insurance, often resulting in a one-sided agreement.23 The mem-
bers have no way of knowing whether the charges they pay are fair and
reasonable for the benefits they hope to receive. It is inevitable that many
members will pay assessments for years and then drop their membership.
This relieves the association of its obligation and results in clear profit of the
amount paid in before discontinuance. Similarly, the members are ignorant as
to the administration expenses of the association and the actual costs to the
official undertaker in furnishing the services. The percentage of profit is almost
at the whim of the organizers of the association. These matters rarely receive
judicial attention because the small amount for which each burial certificate
is written makes it not feasible in most instances for the member to bring suit.
If a suit is threatened the association will usually perform the particular
contract in order to avoid the suit. (2) Stability, one of the most essential
elements of an insurance organization for adequate public protedIion, is
totally lacking. There is no certainty that there will be a solvent concern
able to perform the contract on the death of a member.2 4 (3) The official
undertaker is the person who derives the primary benefit from the contract
20. Such a method has been found practical and profitable, for example, by the
Cosmopolitan Life Insurance Co. of Memphis, Tenn. Four funeral homes are now being
operated in the cities of Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville and Chattanooga. They are in-
corporated separately under the name Cosmopolitan Funeral Home.
21. See note 9 supra.
22. Quinn, Burial Associations and the Law, 23 LAW STuD. HELPER 11 (1915).
23. "Some of the provisions are unreasonable, some unguarded, and others indefinite,
and tend to expose the concern to the suspicion that the whole system is, in real design,
but the scheme of an undertaker to promote his private business, largely at the expense
of persons of small means." State -v. Willett, 171 Ind. 296, 86 N.E. 68, 71 (1908).
24. "[T]he contract is not one that the courts will strain the laws to uphold. It
is freighted with the greatest possibilities of fraud .... It is certain that many of these
certificates will not be ripe for redemption for a number of years, and it is reasonably
certain that some of them will survive the life of the corporation itself." State ex rel.




rather than the relatives of the insured.25 (4) The contract obligates the
survivors of the insured to accept the services of the association's official
undertaker, thereby taking away the right to purchase maximum services at
minimum price in the open market.26 (5) There is a tendency to promote
inferior service.
Because of these basic objections, the courts are unsympathetic toward
these associations and endeavor to bring them within the scope of state
insurance statutes by holding that the contracts with members are life insurance
contracts.27 When an injunction is secured against an association it is usually
driven out of existence since by its nature, there is an inability to comply
with state insurance statutes. However, beneficial societies which are deemed
to be founded on philanthropic, benevolent or charitable principles rather than
for business purposes, are more favorably regarded by the courts. 28 These
societies are regulated under separate statutes in most states with the re-
quirements for inclusion being that the societies are nonprofit orgarfizations
with limited membership and a ritualistic form of work.29
Many attempts have been made to avoid state regulation by disguising
the insurance features of the burial contract. These attempts are very rarely
successful because of the realistic attitude adopted by most courts to determine
the validity of the contract by its nature and effect, rather than by the
terminology used to characterize it.30 Thus, in State v. Smith Funeral Serv-
25. State v. Willett, 171 Ind. 296, 86 N.E. 68, 23 L.R.A. (N.s.) 197 (1908). How-
ever, for purposes of meeting the argument that burial contracts are not life insurance
contracts because of the lack of a beneficiary, it has been held that the person who would
otherwise be obligated to pay the burial expenses of the deceased is the beneficiary in the
legal sense. State ex tel. Fishback v. Globe Casket & Undertaking Co., 82 Wash. 124,
143 Pac. 878, 879, 1915B L.R.A. 976 (1914).
26. See Robbins v. Hennessey, 86 Ohio St. 181, 99 N.E. 319 (1912) ; Quinn, Burial
Associations and the Law, 23 LAw STUD. HELPER 11 (1915).
27. E.g., State ex rel. Landis v. De Witt C. Jones Co., 108 Fla. 613, 147 So. 230
(1933) ; Clark v. Harrison, 182 Ga. 56, 184 S.E. 620 (1936) ; State v. Willett, 171 Ind.
286, 86 N.E. 68, 23 L.R.A. (x.s.) 197 (1908) ; State cx rel. Att'y Gen. v. Wichita Mut.
Burial Ass'n, 73 Kan. 179, 84 Pac. 757 (1906) ; Renschler v. State ex rel. Hogan, 90
Ohio St. 363, 107 N.E. 758, 1915D L.R.A. 501 (1914) ; Oklahoma Southwestern Burial
Ass'n v. State ex tel. Read, 135 Okla. 151, 274 Pac. 642, 63 A.L.R. 704 (1929) ; Sisson
ex rel. Nardolillo v. Prata Undertaking Co., 49 R.I. 132, 141 Atl. 76 (1928) ; State cx
tel. Dist. Att'y Gen. v. Mutual Mortuary Ass'n, 166 Tenn. 260, 61 S.W.2d 664 (1933);
State ex rel. Reece v. Stout, 17 Tenn. App. 10, 65 S.W.2d 827 (M.S. 1933).
28. State ex rel. Kuble v. Capitol Ben. Ass'n, 237 Iowa 363, 21 N.W.2d 890 (1946) ;
Pirics v. First Russian Slavonic Greek Catholic Benevolent Society, 83 N.J. Eq. 29,
89 Atl. 1036 (Ch. 1914) ; State v. Taylor, 56 N.J.L. 49, 27 Atl. 797 (Sup. Ct. 1893),;
Cowan v. New York Caledonian Club, 46 App. Div. 288, 61 N.Y. Supp. 714 (2d Dep't
1899) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Equitable Beneficial Ass'n, 137 Pa. 412, 18
Atl. 1112 (1890).
29. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-1601 et seq. (1937) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:39-1 el
seq. (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6357 et seq. (Williams 1934). Insofar as the societies
cited in note 28 supra do not fall in this separate category the cases are contra to the
majority view, which holds organizations of this type amenable to life insurance regula-
tions.
30. E.g., State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Wichita Mut. Burial Ass'n, 73 Kan. 179, 84
Pac. 757 (1906) ; State ex tel. Fishback v. Globe Casket & Undertaking Co., 82 Wash.
124, 143 Pac. 878, 1915B L.R.A. 976 (1914).
[ VOL,. 5
ice,31 the certificates furnished to members as evidence of membership* in it
burial association, allowed an 80% discount on a casket and grave clothes,
and provided that the right to purchase could be exercised by the certificate
holder at any time prior to death. The court in striking down the arrange-
ment for noncompliance with state statutes said, "the apparent right given
to a certificate holder of defendant to demand his coffin and grave clothes prior
to his death is a right of such improbable exercise that it does not alter what
we regard the real nature of the contract." 32 Similarily, calling the contracts
options to purchase (as in South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrision) ,
3
mutual notes,34 or contending that the certificates were merely personal service
contracts 35 has been of no avail in defeating the application of regulatory
insurance laws. However, after the decision in the South Georgia Funeral
Homes case granting the insurance commissioner an injunction, the defendant
added a provision to the contract making the unpaid balance due and col-
lectible at the exercise of the option to purchase by the-holder. Defendant
continued to deal in these amended option contracts, and an action was
instituted for contempt for violating the injunctive order.36 The -court
refused to look through the terminology of the contract and held that
this was not a contract of insurance because the element of risk had been
eliminated.3 7 This unrealistic attitude is subject to criticism in light of the
need for regulation of a business of this type.38 The Georgia- legislature ex-
pressed its disapproval of the decision by declaring contracts of this nature
to be life insurance even though "the cost or value of the undertaking on the
part of the insurer be more or less than the consideration flowing to him.'"39
Two- years later in Harrison v. Tanner-Poindexter Co.,40 an injunction was
sought by the commissioner, against a defendant who had entered.into con-
tracts with its customers, whereby defendant agreed to sell caskets and burial
supplies, each buyer-member agreeing to pay 75 cents every two months until
the sum of $250 was paid. If the buyer died before the full amount was paid
his estate would be liable for the balance. The court had little trouble in
31. 177 Tenn. 41, 145 S.W.2d 1021 (1940), 16 TENN. L. REv. 878 (1941).
32. 177 Tenn. at 46, 145 S.W.2d at 1023.
33. 182 Ga. 60, 184, S.E. 875 (1936).
34. Renschler v. State ex rel. Hogan, 90 Ohio St. 363, 107 N.E. 758, 1915D L.R.A.
501 (1914). The contract, termed a mutual note, provided that the member would pay
fifteen cents (called interest) by the tenth of every month, while the defendant agreed to
furnish a funeral worth $50 to $100 if the member be not in default at death.
35. State ex rel. Landis v. De Witt C. Jones Co., 108 Fla. 613, 147 So. 230 (1933).
36. South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrison, 183 Ga. 379, 188 S.E. 529 (1936).
37. "There is nothing in the contract itself nor is there any evidence to show that the
amount paid by a purchaser is less than the value of the funeral services contracted to be
performed, or that there is any element of risk involved. . . .The contract on its face
does not appear to be one of life insurance." 188 S.E. at 531.
38. See 15 N.C.L. REv. 417 (193Z).
39. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-901 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
40. 187 Ga. 678, 1 S.E.2d 646 (1939).
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holding that defendant was engaged in the life insurance business even though
the contract apparently contained no element of risk.
III. APPLICATION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES TO BURIAL ASSOCIATIONS
The most significant observation concerning legislation on burial asso-
ciations is the lack of specific statutory regulation. Most state legislatures
have not taken official cognizance of the problems by placing associations of
this type in separate categories in their codes. In these states the task is left
to the courts to bring the associations within the scope of the general insurance
statutes by holding that the business carried on is life insurance.
However, several states have enacted specific legislation that more or
less rigidly regulates burial associations. Of these the North Carolina treat-
ment is probably the most comprehensive.41 Burial associations are subject
to detailed regulations and are placed under the direct control and supervision
of a special commissioner appointed by the governor. Each association is
required to adopt the set of rules and by-laws set out in the code as a
condition of doing business. In order to meet the expenses of supervision
each association is assessed on a pro rata basis according to the number of
members it has. The amount and frequency of assessments collected from the
members and the benefits flowing to them are specifically set out. A minimum
membership of 800 is required of each association, and if this number is not
secured within ninety days after the charter is granted, the commissioner must
revoke the license and transfer the membership to another association. A bond
in the amount of 25% of the surplus, but in no case less than $1000 is re-
quired of the secretary-treasurer of all associations. Provision is also made
for an election of the funeral benefits or a return of assessments paid by the
widow or next of kin of a serviceman killed while in service.
The Mississippi treatment is less comprehensive but still adequate.4 2
At least three incorporators with not less than $5000 capital are required
to form an association. Securities ranging in amount from one to ten thiousand
dollars must be deposited with the commissioner who is given extensive
powers of inspection and supervision. The Nevada code, after defining burial
contracts and requiring registration of burial associations, provides that they
shall be governed by all statutory provisions concerning life insurance.48 The
Florida legislature has attempted to restrict the organization of burial asso-
ciations, rather than to recognize and regulate them.44 The statutes forbid
any organization from entering into a contract designating a specific under-
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-224 to 58-241.4 (1950).
42. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 5592-5605 (1942).
43. NEv. ComP. LAWs ANN. §§ 3656.110-3656.113 (Supp. 1941).
44. FLA. STAT. AwN. §§ 639.01-639.05 (1944).
taker to conduct the funeral, or to organize or promote any plan whereby a
member is deprived of the advantages of competition in the purchase of burial
services in the open market. Illinois, 45 Nebraska46 and Virginia4 7 have similar
provisions against this restraint on trade; but unlike Florida, these states
recognize the legality of associations that comply with their regulations.
The Oklahoma legislature has provided that all nonprofit associations
which limit their benefits to $100, and which pay no salaries or fees to their
officers, are exempt from the operation and effect of the other insurance
laws of the state.48 But under this act not more than 25% of the association
funds can be used for operating expenses, while 75% must be held as a
trust fund for the benefit of its members. For supervision, a nonsalaried
board consisting of five members experienced in operating funeral homes and
burial associations, is appointed by the governor for two-year terms. Until
the recent repeal of its statute on the matter, Texas grouped burial associa-
tions with all life, health and accident companies whose funds are derived
from assessments. 49 Kentucky specifically regulates associations in much the
same manner as the other states discussed but imposes the very restrictive
requirement that securities in the amount of $100,000 be deposited with the
commissioner for the benefit of.members.
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The problems of regulation of burial associations in Tennessee are both
interesting and provocative. These problems arise from an exemption from
state insurance laws granted by the legislature. "Nothing contained in this
article shall be construed to affect or apply to . .. domestic lodges, orders or
associations of a purely religious, charitable and beneficiary description, which
do not provide for a death benefit of more than. $100.O0." 5 'This was first
construed in State ex rel. Reece v. Gooch52, in 1932. It was held that a
voluntary association organized on the assessment plan with burial benefits
limited to $100 was a benevolent society and came within the exemption from
compliance with the insurance laws.53 The question has arisen only twice
subsequent to the Gooch case. In State ex rel. Dist. Att'y Gen. v. Mutual
Mortuary Ass'n,54 and State ex rel. Reece v. Stout,55 it was held that asso-
ciations of the type in the Gooch case were engaged in the life insurance
45. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 73, §§ 950-963 (1936).
46. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-1001 to 21-017 (1943).
47. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 38-143 to 38-158 (1950).
48. OXLA. STAT., tit. 36, §§ 771-775 (1941).
49. TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5068-1, §§ 23, 24 (1925). (Repealed 1951).
50. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 303.090-303.990 (Baldwin 1943).
51. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6421 (Williams 1934) (italics added).
52. 165 Tenn. 97, 52 S.W.2d 143 (1932).
53. Id. at 101.
54. 166 Tenn. 260, 61 S.W.2d 664 (1933).
55. 17 Tenn. App. 10, 65 S.W.2d 827 (M.S. 1933).
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business, and since the benefits they offered were not limited to $100 they
were not exempt under section 6421.
The exemption granted in section 6421 was evidently a compromise
by the Tennessee legislature. The definition of a contract of insurance is so
broadly worded" that it would include almost every conceivable form or
arrangement guaranteeing a burial at death. It was not desired completely
to prohibit this type of insurance since it is socially desirable in the sense
that it insures a decent funeral to people in the low income group at a
comparatively low cost.
The exemption allowed in section 6421 being the only code provision
concerning burial associations, the statutory law imposes no restrictions upon
them other than the $100 limitation. There is no provision for registration
with the commissioner of insurance, and the only authority granted the
commissioner is that of section 6422 empowering him to require from any
society such information as will enable him to determine whether a particular
society is exempt.5 7 These associations have been organized in all parts of the
state. Undoubtedly there are many of whose existence the commissioner's
office is unaware. It is the policy promptly to investigate all complaints against
associations, whether made by individuals or discovered by field investigators;
but until there is a reported violation the presumption is that of compliance
with the law.
In 1931, when the exemption was written into law $100 was an adequate
amount to purchase a decent funeral. But the exemption has not kept stride
with the changed economic conditions so that today, in light of the inflated
condition of our currency, $100 is hardly a sufficient amount to decently bury a
person. This has led many undertakers, acting through the association device,
to try to evade the $100 limitation by organizing one or more new associations,
each offering $100 death benefits. Then the members of the old association
are solicited to join the new association or associations, the inducement being
that the memberships can be combined for a funeral worth two or three
hundred dollars. This combination of death benefits has never been held to
violate the exemption of section 6421; but the commissioner, charged with
the administration of the exemption, has demanded factual disunity of burial
associations offering this combination of benefits. Any circumstance tending
to show that the associations are not in fact maintained as separate and
distinct organizations has been declared to violate the spirit of section 6421.
The most frequent violations of this administrative order include (1)
soliciting new members in the same advertisements, (2) maintaining com-
56. TENN. CoDE ANIN. § 6085 (Williams 1934).
57. Id. § 6422.
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mon office facilities, (3) billing assessments for two or more associations on
the same statement, and (4) receiving payments of assessments for two or
more associations at the same place. Whenever any one or a combination of
the above is found to exist, pressure is immediately brought on the associations
to discontinue the practices. The threat of withholding the exemption of
section 6421 is usually sufficient to deter associations from continuing the
practices. The paucity of reported cases concerning burial associaions in
Tennessee can be explained by the infrequent necessity for the commissioner
to resort to the courts for an injunction.
IV. ASPECTS OF THE CONTRACT
Since contracts guaranteeing a burial at death are by nature life in-
surance contracts, the rules of construction governing life policies are applied
to burial contracts in most instances. For example, the insurer's contractual
obligation has been held to run to the beneficiary, as in the case with life
insurance, rather than to his administrator 58 or executor.5 9 Also, concerning
the effect of misrepresentations the rule applied to life policies applies e qually to
burial policies so that a misrepresentation, in fact false and material to the
risk, avoids the policy even though made through mistake, or in good faith.60
The doctrine of waiver has been held applicable to strike down an insurer's
defense to a suit on a burial policy.61 Although no cases have been found, it
is likely that the law of warranties, so frequently resorted to in suits on life
policies, will be applied to burial contracts. Again, a burial association may be
held liable in tort to an applicant for the unreasonable delay in accepting
or rejecting his application for membership just as some states impose liability
upon life insurers under similar circunstances.
62
However, there are certain problems found in burial insurance contracts
which are not raised by the standard life insurance contract. These stem largely
from the fact that burial contracts are payable in services rather than in
money. Though this fact does not deprive the burial contract of its character
58. Jordan's Mutual Aid Ass'n v. Edwards, 232 Ala. 80, 166 So. 780 (1936).
59. In re Beidelman's Estate, 133 Atl. 873 (N.J. Orph. Ct 1926).
60. Blanchard v. Jackson Funeral System Ass'n, 327 Ill. App. 290, 64 N.E.2d 201
(1945). Contra: Walters v. Reliance Industrial Life Ins. Co., 180 So. 880 (La. App. 1938).
61. Tarbutton v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 17 So.2d 365 (La. App. 1944),
62. Capitol Hill Burial Ass'n v. Oliver, 185 Okla. 261, 91 P.2d 673 (1939). The
rationale of decisions holding the insurer liable in tort for not accepting or rejecting
applications within a reasonable time is that the insurer, enjoying a state franchise, has
a duty to process applications promptly. See, e.g., Bekken v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200 (1940); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Scott,
181 Okla. 179, 72 P.2d 790 (1937); Dyer v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co., 132
Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925). The law review material on this subject is voluminous.
See, e.g., Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 207 (1927) ; Prosser, Delay in Acting on an Application for Insurance, 3 U. OF
Clr. L. REv. 39 (1935).
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as a life insurance contract,6 3 it does present some rather unique problems of
construction. The services to be rendered upon the death of an insured
are of such an emergency nature that the insurer is held to the highest degree
of performance. In Winders v. Co-operative Burial Ass'n,0 4 it was said:
"There was an implied obligation of the most solemn character in this mem-
bership certificate that the deceased's body would be promptly removed from
his home, after death, to a decent place where the bodies of the dead are
prepared for burial, and that such be done efficiently and with no undue
embarrassment or mortification to those in grief."0 5 The court in this case
held that the contract was breached when the defendant offered funeral
arrangements involving an unreasonable delay. The amount of recovery
was the cost to the plaintiff in securing a funeral with an undertaker other
than the one designated by the association.
Several interesting cases have arisen from the fact that the insured died
under such circumstances that it was impossible or impractical for the insurer
to render the burial services required by the contract. The usual holding in
cases of this nature is that the insurer is not relieved of its obligation by the
impossibility but rather is held liable for the face amount of the policy in
cash.60 These decisions are often predicated on statutes which provide for
cash payments of the contractual obligations in lieu of services.0 7 However,
it was held in a recent Texas case that where the certificate of membership
provided that no cash would be paid if services were not accepted, the de-
fendant fulfilled its obligation by tendering the services even though the
member had been lost at sea and acceptance was impossible.18 This result was
63. See note 14 supra.
64. 157 So. 320 (La. App. 1934).
65. Id. at 323.
66. Bruce v. Kilpatrick Life Ins. Co., 27 So.2d 634 (La. App. 1946); Mississippi
Ben. Ass'n v. Majure, 201 Miss. 183, 29 So.2d 110 (1947); Guardian Burial Ass'n v.
Rodgers, 163 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). "Liability cannot be avoided by
defendant by the imposition of an impossible condition precedent to its discharge of said
liability. The body of the unfortunate service man is somewhere in the depths of the
ocean that engulfed it when the carrier sank therein. If the condition imposed in this
case be tenable, then payment under all such policies may be avoided in cases presenting
like facts. This is unthinkable." Bruce v. Kilpatrick Life Ins. Co., supra at 636.
67. See, e.g., LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4170.38(4) (1939). The Tennessee statute on
this matter reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, corporation, com-
pany, or any organization ... to execute or issue a contract on the life of any person
residing in this state, which provides that the death benefit, upon the insured's death,
shall be settled by furnishing the deceased insured with burial or some part of such
service, at a price named in said contract exceeding one hundred ($100.00) dollars, unless
it is also stipulated therein that said death benefit may be paid in cash in a like amount
as the maximum price named or expressed for the burial service or benefit in settlement
of such contract, at the option of the representative of the deceased insured . . . and be
it further provided, that nothing contained in this act shall be construed to apply to any
organizations named in Section 6421 of the Code ...or to any burial association which
issued certificates for burial benefits not exceeding one hundred ($100.00) dollars in
each case." TENN. CODE ANN. § 6459.74 (Supp. 1951).
68. Burleson Burial Ass'n v. Free, 176 S.W.2d 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
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reached in spite of the existence of a cash-in-lieu-of-services statute.69 An
analogous question is presented when the insured is buried in potter's field
or at the expense of relatives because the insurer has refused to perform its
contractual obligatiopi. Recovery in these instances is not limited to the
actual expense to the relatives, 70 or to what it would have cost the insurer to
furnish the burial,71 but is for face amount of the policy. The situation has
not arisen in reported cases where the relatives of the insured, not knowing
he holds membership in an association, buries him at their own expense, and
then later sue to recover on the membership certificate. If recovery is al-
lowed, it will be an extension beyond which the courts have gone thus far.
Standard life insurance policies provide for a stated period after death within
which the insurer must be notified. Since this period in burial policies is
necessarily so short, it is not unlikely that the courts will impose liability
even though notice was not given the insurer before the insured was buried.
V. CONCLUSION
Burial insurance furnishes a means by which persons in the low income
group can be assured of a decent burial at a comparatively low cost. When
properly regulated and supervised it performs a very useful social function.
However, when ignored or unattended, the association device may become an
instrument of public abuse in the hands of those seeking the personal profit
to be gained. That a contract guaranteeing a funeral at death is a form of
life insurance is too well settled by logic and decision for there to be a
serious contention otherwise. Consequently, unless the legislature has
provided for specific regulation, the courts will make a blanket application of
the general life insurance statutes, which impose standards much higher
than burial associations are able to meet. Thus the financially sound and
conscientious associations are driven out of business, leaving the fly-by-night
and depredatory organizations, with the result that many people are denied
this type of insurance, particularly in rural areas where the regularly organized
insurers have not sought this business for one reason or another.
It is apparent that the means by which desirable aspects of burial asso-
ciations can be retained, while at the same time insuring protection of the
public from abuses, lies in the hands of state legislatures. Specific statutes
recognizing and regulating this business as a distinct form of life insurance are
needed. Statutes designed to regulate life insurance companies should not be
69. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5068-1, § 24 (1940). (Repealed 1951).
70. Jefferson County Burial Soc. v. Curry, 237 Ala. 548, 187 So. 723 (1939);
Walters v. Reliance Industrial Life Ins. Co., 180 So. 880 (La. App. 1938). See Clegg v.
Johnson, 164 Miss. 888, 143 So. 848, 850 (1932).
71. Allen v. Enterprise Benevolent & Burial Ass'n, 159 So. 127 (La. App. 1935)
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